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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GAIL PATRICIA MENZ, 
Petitioner/Appellant 
v. 




CASE NO. 20000266-CA 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: 
In this brief "T" refers to the transcript of the proceedings 
from the trial, preceded by terms such as "Trial T." or "Closing 
T." or "Motion T." designate the volume, "Closing T." referring to 
the "Closing Arguments and Judge's Ruling", dated April 28, 2000. 
"R" refers to the record of the court, and "Ex" refers to exhibit, 
followed by the exhibit number. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION: 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 
the provisions of 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated, Section 5, Article 
VIII of the Utah Constitution, and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW: 
ISSUE ONE: 
DID THE DISTRICT COURT UNDER JUDGE DEVER ERROR PROCEDURALLY 
IN TWICE MODIFYING FINDINGS AND A DECREE ENTERED BY THE JUDGE 
WHO HAD HEARD AND TRIED THE CASE? 
Standard for Review: 
(1) A trial court's conclusions of law in a civil case 
are reviewed for correctness and therefore no deference 
is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law. 
State v. Pena, 869 P2d 932 (Utah 1994); United Park City 
Mines Co. v. Greater ffark City Co., 870 P2d 880 (Utah 1993) . 
(2) Whether the trial court properly granted or denied a 
motion to open a judgment for additional evidence or for a 
new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P2d 518 (Utah 
App., 1999) 
ISSUE TWO: 
DID THE COURT UNDER JUDGE DEVER ERROR IN REALLOCATING THE 
ASSETS AND DEBTS FROM THE ALLOCATION MADE FIRST BY JUDGE 
THORNE AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN HIS OWN REVISED FINDINGS? 
Standards for Review: 
(1) Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce 
matters so long as the decision is within the confines 
of legal precedence. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P2d 1065 
(Utah App. 1994). 
(2) Property and alimony awards will be upheld unless a clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Howell 
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DID THE SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENTS TO JUDGE THORNE'S FINDINGS 
BY JUDGE DEVER CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND DID 
SUCH CHANGES LEAVE THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WITHOUT ADEQUATE 
FINDINGS TO SUPPORT THEM? 
Standara^ of Review: 
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reviewing court i s 1 eft wi th a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed even 
though there is evidence to support the finding. Cummings 
v. Cummings, 821 P2d 472 (Utah App. 1991) . 
(2) Appellate courts give great deference to the trial 
court's findings of fact in divorce cases, and do not 
overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. Elmer v. 
Elmer, 776 P2d 599 (Utah 1989). 
(3) To ensure the court acted within its broad discretion, 
the facts and reasons for the court's decision must be 
set forth fully in appropriate findings and conclusions. 
Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P2d 257 (Utah App. 1993) . 
(4) Although considerable deference is accorded to 
factual findings, conclusion of law arising from those 
findings are to be reviewed for correctness and are given 
no special deference on appeal. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P2d 
1065 (Utah App. 1994) . 
(5) The correctness of error standard means that no particular 
deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions 
of law. State v. Pena, 869 P2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
(6) If the findings are legally inadequate marshalling the 
evidence supporting the findings becomes futile. (Williamson 
v. Williamson, 1999 Ut App 208. 
ISSUE FOUR: 
THE ARGUMENTS OF GAIL MENZ TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL MONIES 
INTO THE MARITAL ESTATE ARE FALLACIOUS. 
Standards of Review: 
See standards for issues 2 and 3 above. 
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Findings or Fact ai^-i , t-u 1 us ions or L*w, r : 1 ^ d June ,:- 2000 (R 
1110) 
6. Petitioner's Objections to Respondent's Proposed Decree of 
Divorce, filed June 26, 2000. (R. 1121) 
7. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law signed by Judge 
Thorne June 30, 2000, and entered July 5, 2000. (R. 1125). 
NOTE: There are two sets of findings and two decrees initially. One 
signed by Judge Thorne and then another signed by Judge Dever. 
8. Decree of Divorce signed by Judge Thorne June 30, 2000, and 
entered July 5, 2000. (R. 1142). 
9. Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Objections to the 
Proposed Findings and Decree, filed July 10, 2 000. 
10. Minute entry by Judge Dever on November 2, 2000, deleting 
portions of the findings and making corrections. (R. 1160) 
11. Revised Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered 
January 16, 2001, and signed by Judge Dever.. (R. 1184) 
12. Revised Decree of Divorce entered January 16, 2001, signed 
by Judge Dever. (R. 1197) 
13. Petitioner's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Decree of Divorce, filed January 25, 2001. (R. 1205). 
14. Reply of Respondent to Motion to Amend Findings and Decree 
of Divorce. (R. 1248). 
15. Second memorandum of petition in support of motion to 
amend findings. (R. 1260) 
16. Hearing before Judge Dever on April 4, 2001, on 
petitioner's motions to amend findings and decree. (R. 1287, R. 
1351-Transcript.) 
17. Minutes from hearing on motion resulting in change of 
6 
property distribution. (R. 1288) 
18. Order Amending Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce, signed by Judge Dever and entered June 6, 2001. 
(R. 1297) 
19. Motions filed to extend filing of notices of appeal. (R. 
1312, and 1328) . 
20. Order Extending Filing Date for Notice of Appeal and Cross 
Appeal, entered August 1, 2001. (R. 1334) 
21. Notice of Appeal. (R. 1304) 
22. Notice of Cross Appeal. (R. 1337) 
23. Order from the Court of Appeals resulting from a 
stipulated motion to remand, wherein the Court of Appeals ordered 
the case remanded for a conference between Judges Thorne and Dever 
to correct the record from the two conflicting decrees and sets of 
findings. 
24. Minute Entry of Judge Dever ruling on the Court of 
Appeals' directions, signed and entered June 5, 2002. (R. 1352) 
(C) Disposition in Lower Court: 
Bench trial conducted February 22 and 23, 2000. Property 
divided per ruling of Judge Thorne, embodied in Decree. The ruling 
of Judge Thorne, his findings, and his Decree were amended twice by 
Judge Dever, both on requests of petitioner Gail Menz to modify the 
ruling of Judge Thorne. Modifications of the record and ruling of 
Judge Thorne were made by Judge Dever under a temporary remand 
order of the Court of Appeals. 
7 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married to each other on November 26, 
1967, in Phoenix, Arizona. (R. 1) 
2. Three female children were born as issue of the marriage 
but at all times material to this case the children were 
emancipated and married. 
3. The parties separated just after Christmas in 1998, 
(R.1186) but the petitioner had filed for divorce in November, 
1998. (R. 1) 
4. During the marriage the parties acquired a home in Salt 
Lake County. Based upon appraisal testimony coupled with the loan 
balance the court found that there was $313,000.00 in equity in the 
home. This fact is not contested. (R. 1238) The appraisal date was 
January, 2000. (Ex. Dl) 
5. After the parties separated and before the appraisal was 
performed Gail Menz had repairs and maintenance performed on the 
family residence, such as painting the house and fence, tree 
removal, repair of lights, the cost for which she valued at 
$8,241.00. (Ex. P15; Trial T. 140) 
6. A second piece of real property had been purchased for one 
of the daughters, and the court found that no interest was claimed 
by either party. (R. 1240) 
7. The court found that there was $20,000.00 in value for 
household contents. (R. 1240) Judge Dever later lowered this tc 
$8,500.00, which had been the estimated value some of the evidence 
of Gail Menz. Gail Menz testified at trial that it had a value of 
8 
about $5,000, but her testimony seemed very unsure and confused. 
(Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 154; See also Ex. P16) 
8. Gail Menz was awarded a 1998 GMC valued by the court at 
$18,000.00. (R. 1348 (Trial T. Vol I, p. 45). 
9. It was the intention of Judge Thorne to divide the assets 
of the marriage equally, but in his final calculations he 
inadvertently failed to add in the value of this GMC automobile 
belonging to Mrs. Menz. This defect in the calculations was 
corrected by Judge Dever in his opinion of November, 2000, thus 
changing the amount due Bill Menz and properly balancing the 
amounts per the expressed intent of Judge Thorne. (R. 1160) 
10. The parties owned a house trailer valued at $1,500.00. (R. 
1188) 
11. Bill Menz was awarded a pickup truck worth $28,000.00, 
which he had purchased and used as his separate vehicle. (R. 1188) 
12. Gail Menz had 401k and 454 accounts through her employment 
as a teacher with Granite School District, which the court valued 
at $20,000.00 as of the January, 2000 statement. (R. 1188, R. 1349 
Trial T. Vol 1, p. 62) 
13. However, as of June 30, 1999, the balance in her two plans 
was $70,378.24 according to her testimony. (R.1349, Trial T. Vol.1, 
p. 62) 
14. She then made withdrawals leaving a balance of $20,000.00 
as of the date of trial, or more accurately, as of the January, 
2000 statement. (R. 1349, Trial T. Vol. 1, pp 62-63) Thus, she had 
spent a little over $50,000 during that six month period while the 
divorce action was pending. 
15. A major issue was the fact that during the months prior tc 
the filing of the divorce Mrs. Menz had accumulated approximately 
$50,000.00 in credit card debt, about $40,000.00 of which was 
expended for the three married daughters, and most of it for what 
one may possibly characterize as extravagant gifts. (Ex. P2) 
16. The parties had a debt with Zions Bank in the way of an 
equity line of credit, with a balance of $13,533.73, which amount 
was paid in full on November 5, 1998 by Gail Menz. It does not 
appear that additional charges were made against the account 
between the time of separation and the time of payment, although 
this isn't entirely clear from the record. (Ex. P3) 
17. Gail Menz testified this debt entailed monies for a car 
for one of the children (about $6,000), and the remainder went to 
the kids, with part of it being used to pay off debts of the 
children. (Trial T. Vol 1, pp 39-42; Trial T. Vol 2, pp. 170-171) 
18. Bill Menz had been previously employed with Boart Longyear 
Company. He had a pension valued at $137,200.00, but this was a 
fixed account that generates $1,632.00 per month gross and 
$1,232.00 per month net income to him. (R. 1188) 
19. Bill Menz has an IRA account valued at $317,000.00. This 
was the value at the time of trial. (R. 1188) 
20. Gail Menz had an IRA account valued at $100,000.00. 
21. To this point the combined assets listed total 
$954,700.00. (R. 1189) 
22. For some time prior to the fall of 1998 the two parties 
had been maintaining a joint account with Fidelity Investment. 
(R.1350-Trial T. Vol 2, p. 209) 
23. At that time, and as of the November 30, 1998 statement, 
the account was valued at $404,840.97. (Ex. P18) 
24. It is undisputed, based upon the testimony of both 
parties, that the nature of the Fidelity Investments account was an 
account that where the monies were invested into securities, and 
was not a cash account. To draw money from the account one could 
seek a loan against the securities, or have securities sold to 
generate the desired funds. (R. 1350, Trial T. Vol 2, pp. 146 and 
209.) 
25. Prior to this time, in August, 1995, Bill Menz received 
the sum of $82,300.00 from an inheritance, and this amount was 
invested into the joint Fidelity Investment account. (R. 1187) 
26. After this point in time the mother of Gail Menz had died 
and in January, 1997, Gail Menz received an inheritance from her 
mother's estate in the amount of $176,000.00. (R. 1187; R. 1350, 
Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 103.) From this she took $140,000.00 and 
invested into the joint Fidelity Investment account held with her 
husband, Bill Menz. (R. 1187; R. 1350, Trial T. Vol. 1, pp. 28-32) 
The remainder she used for her own purposes. 
27. These monies were commingled during these time periods up 
until the time of the separation of the parties and the withdrawals 
of money from this account by Gail Menz. (R. 1349 Trial T. Vol. 1, 
p. 33) Gail Menz testified that these monies were used by them to 
pay for weddings, food, and other expenses. (Id.) 
11 
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28. As stated above, at the time the marriage began tc 
collapse in November, 1998, the account was valued at $404,840.97. 
(Ex. 18) However, just prior to this November time, Gail Menz had 
withdrawn an initial sum of $140,000.00 from the account in 
October. (Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 145.) 
29. Upon learning that this was actually a loan against the 
securities they owned in the account, she returned to Fidelity the 
sum of $106,000.00. (R. Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 145.; Ex. 18) The 
remaining $34,000.00 she kept and put in her Zions Bank account. 
(Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 146) 
30. The amount of $404,840.97 as of November 1, 1998, 
reflected in Exhibit P18 is the balance in the account after the 
prior withdrawal of $140,000.00. (Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 145, 146.) 
31. After Gail Menz deposited the $106,000.00 with Fidelity 
she withdrew from the same account the sum of $222,000.00 after the 
sale of stock from the account. (Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 146) Thus, by 
the end of November, 1998, Gail Menz has withdrawn from the account 
at least the $34,000.00 plus the $222,000.00, for a total of 
$256,000.00. It is an agreed fact, as pointed out in the brief of 
Gail Menz, that the actual total was $261,000.00 for the October tc 
November period, which is correct when one adds in some additional 
small withdrawals by Gail Menz during that October. This left 
$201,211.59 in the account as of the end of the November reportinc 
period. (Ex. P18) The balance as of October 1, 1998 was 
$422,997.07. (Ex. D9) 
32. After Gail Menz withdrew $261,000.00 from the joint 
Fidelity account there was a balance remaining of $201,211.59. (Ex. 
P18) Bill Menz then took that money and deposited it into a new 
account with Fidelity in his name alone. (Trial T. Vol 2, p. 201, 
11. 9-13) 
33. Over a period of time, apparently up until the time of 
trial in February, 2000, that amount had grown to $277,992.00, 
which growth Bill Menz testified resulted from "managing and 
investing and--and watching it very carefully." (Trial T. Vol 2, p. 
201.) He had not made deposits into the account. (Id.) 
34. On April 28, 2000, closing arguments took place before 
Judge William A. Thorne, after which he made his ruling. (Closing 
T.) As part of ruling he stated as follows at p. 45: 
"Let me state before I start that once inherited 
income is placed into a joint account, it loses its 
independent character and I'm not going to trace it back 
beyond that. The parties make a decision to put it into 
a joint account, it loses its separate identity and 
becomes a joint asset." 
He then proceeded to list the assets of the marriage. 
35. Judge Thorne stated his position on his calculation of the 
Joint Fidelity Account as follows: 
"Plus, I then went back and calculated the value of the joint 
savings account since I do not believe that a separate --
maintains any kind of separate identity. The 145 that was 
withdrawn, the 116 that was withdrawn shows 261 that was 
withdrawn, 116 left over, for a total of 377. 
"Adding that into the prior assets comes up with a total 
assets of $1,331,700. Splitting that in half is $665,850. 
"The reason I've split it in half is I do not believe that 
the value is an issue in this marriage. Certainly, each side 
can point fingers and say they're at fault for this or they're 
at fault for that. This is not, in my mind, the circumstance 
contemplated by the legislature where it indicates that fault 
can be taken into account in distributing the assets of the 
estate. 
"Therefore, my goal is to divide the assets in half, coming up 
with $665,850 for each." (Closing T. p. 46) 
36. Judge Thorne signed the first set of Findings of Fact and 
the first Decree of Divorce on June 30, 2000, and they were entered 
on July 5, 2002. (R. 1125 and R. 1142) The fact that these 
pleadings had been signed was not known to counsel for the parties 
until different times in the future due to the fact that it took an 
unusual period of time for the signed copies to reach the file. 
37. Gail Menz filed an objection to the proposed findings and 
decree on June 26, 2000. (R. 1121) The respondent, Bill Menz, 
filed a reply to the objection. (R. 1148-1153) 
38. On November 2, 2000, Judge Dever entered a Minute Entry in 
response to the objection and reply filed by the respective 
parties, which included substantial changes to the findings of 
fact, but left in tact the conclusions and terms of the decree. (R. 
1160) 
39. On January 16, 2001, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law were entered by Judge Dever in keeping with his prior minute 
entry ruling. (R. 1184 and R. 1197) At this point there are now 
two decrees and two sets of findings on file. The language quoted 
above from Judge Thorne's opinion and to a degree set forth in his 
findings are also set forth in the amended findings of Judge Dever. 
(R. 1184) 
40. On January 25, 2001, the petitioner files a Motion to 
Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce. (R. 1205) This is the second proceeding commenced by Gail 
Menz to amend the findings and decree. 
41. After oral argument on April 4, 2001, minutes (R. 1288), 
a proposed order and objection to the order, the court enters an 
order again amending the findings and decree on June 6, 2001. (R. 
1297) These changes are as follows: 
a. The court altered the disbursement and description 
of monies in the Fidelity Investment Account. (R. 1298) 
b. Gail Menz had paid a home equity loan and the 
court found this was from her own money and therefore 
reduced the equity in the home by $13,533.00, although 
$13,500.00 is also mentioned. (R. 1299) 
c. The inheritances of each are treated as separate 
property and not as marital property. (R. 1299) 
d. The value of the household furnishings is 
reduced from $20,000.00 to $8,500.00. (R. 1230) 
e. The court shifted around the disbursement of the 
Joint Fidelity Account. (R. 1298) 
f. The lien in the marital home in favor of Bill Menz 
in the amount of $66,150.00, used by Judge Thorne to 
equalize the disbursement of assets, was eliminated. 
g. Bill Menz was ordered to pay to Gail Menz $17,822.00 
to equalize the accounts. (R. 1301) 
h. Bill Menz was awarded $76,781.00 from the Fidelity 
account, which was above and beyond what the court 
deemed to be joint funds. (R. 1301) 
42. Judge Thorne, and later Judge Dever before his second 
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change of the outcome, had found the total marital assets to be 
divided to be $1,331,700.00. (R. 1191) The above changes by Judge 
Dever resulted in marital assets of $566,967.00 (R. 1301), a 
reduction of $162,122.00. This resulted in a net loss to Bill Menz 
between the two opinions of $81,061.00. 
43. Here a problem develops in the record due to the fact that 
two decrees exist, along with an order amending the second. As a 
result the Court of Appeals orders the matter temporarily remanded 
to resolve the problems extant in the record. (R. 1346) 
44. In a Minute Entry dated June 5, 2002, Judge Dever speaks 
of a conference held between him and Judge Thorne relative to the 
conflict between the two decrees. (NOTE: This is in the record, 
just before R. 1284, in Vol. V, but is lacking a page number. A 
copy is attached as Addendum "A". A letter from the Court of 
Appeals to Judge Dever, dated May 1, 2002, is attached as Addendum 
11B", but is not a part of the district court record.) 
45. In the minute entry Judge Dever states that the conference 
was held as a result of a request by the parties, which isn't 
exactly correct since the matter had been remanded by the Court of 
Appeals to resolve the problem. It is correct in that the 
attorneys for the two parties did ask that an actual conference 
take place as contemplated by the order from the Court of Appeals 
and that Judge Dever not merely make a decision on his own. 
46. This minute entry states that it was Judge Thome's 
position that his decree and findings had been signed with the 
assumption that there had been no objection made. However, an 
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objection had been filed by the petitioner, and a note to this 
effect had been placed on the front sheet of the findings of fact 
signed by Judge Thorne. This note has been moved, probably due to 
the existence of the note having been an issue before the oral 
argument with Judge Dever, from its original location on the papers 
signed by Judge Thorne to the face of the Order amending the 
findings signed by Judge Dever, located at R. 1297. The note, 
apparently from the clerk, reads as follows: "Judge Thorne There 
are objections from Suzanne West. Do you want me to set tel/con.!!) 
47. The fact that Judge Thorne had signed a decree and 
findings was made known to Judge Dever by the attorney for Bill 
Menz at the oral argument hearing on the second proceeding to amend 
the findings of fact, although counsel for Gail Menz represented to 
the court that Judge Thorne had never signed any such papers. 
(Motion T. p. 25) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: 
Gail Menz filed two objections to the findings and conclusions 
made first by Judge Thorne and then by Judge Dever. This should 
not be allowed and the first findings and decree signed by Judge 
Dever should be the governing ruling of the lower court and not the 
second ruling. Even if the second is construed as a Motion for New 
Trial Under Rule 59, the court procedurally erred in its ruling and 
the manner in which it was handled. 
POINT II: 
Judge Dever ignored certain facts, didn't understand others, 
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resulting in a ruling that reallocated property in an erroneous 
manner that is unsupported by the facts, and was contrary to his 
own findings. The result was a division of property that was not 
supported by the facts and was not equitable. 
POINT III; 
Great deference should be given to the judge who tried the 
case. Judge Dever's modifications of Judge Thome's ruling should 
require the same standard of review as an appellate court's review 
of a trial court's findings. 
POINT IV: 
Judges Dever and Thorne were ordered by this court to 
conference and resolve the differences in their two opinions. From 
the minute entry of Judge Dever it appears that the conference went 
only so far as to have Judge Thorne indicate he hadn't known there 
was an objection to his findings and decree and they should 
therefore be of no effect. From the very scant record it appears 
Judge Dever then proceeded alone to decide how the property was to 
be divided, despite the fact that the trial judge was available. 
It doesn't appear that the trial judge, Judge Thorne, took part in 
deliberations so that a joint ruling from both judges did not issue 
as to what findings of fact and conclusions of law should be used, 
and instead only one judge's opinion is shown in the final order. 
POINT V: 
The appeal of Gail Menz seeks to have the increased value of 
the money Bill Menz took from the remainder of the joint Fidelity 
Account included in the joint marital property and be divided by 
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the court. While she spent he saved, and it was argued to both 
judges this claim was inequitable due to her proclivity to spend 
and Bill Menz to save. Judge Thorne used the date of division of 




DID THE DISTRICT COURT UNDER JUDGE DEVER ERROR PROCEDURALLY 
IN TWICE MODIFYING FINDINGS AND A DECREE ENTERED BY THE JUDGE 
WHO HAD HEARD AND TRIED THE CASE? 
After the first Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Decree of Divorce were submitted to the court Gail Menz filed 
an objection to those findings and the decree. (R. 1110) This 
objection covers the same issues raised later in the second motion. 
In a Minute Entry from November, 2000, (R. 1160) Judge Dever made 
modifications to the findings and decree, but basically left the 
property division ordered by Judge Thorne intact. (R. 1184) 
The new findings and decree were entered January 16, 2001, (R. 
1203) and Gail Menz then filed a "Petitioner's Motion to Amend 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce", on 
January 25, 2001. We submit the court allowing a hearing and 
awarding relief on this second motion was in error. The hearing 
proceeded despite an objection by counsel for Bill Menz. (Motion T. 
24-25; R. 1248) 
There is nothing in the rules that we are able to locate that 
gives a party two shots at amending findings and/or a decree. Gail 
Menz had already filed one objection and the court had made certain 
modifications from the ruling made by judge Thorne, as seen in the 
attachment to the minute entry. (R. 1162) Gail Menz then should 
have appealed, or filed a motion for a new trial. She did neither, 
but instead filed yet another motion to modify the findings and 
decree. 
One may argue that the motion was in effect a Motion for a New 
Trial under Rule 59, U.R.C.P., and that the title of the motion 
should not weigh against her. However, from its content, the 
nature of the argument and the nature of the proceedings the motion 
is clearly not a motion for a new trial, but instead is 
definitively a request that the court modify once again the ruling 
of the trial judge. The trial court has broad discretionary power 
to grant or deny new trials, and is based upon the need to correct 
a jury verdict (there was no jury here), correct findings which it 
believes to be in error (but where does the discretion of the trial 
judge lie?), or where there is substantial doubt that the issues 
were fairly tried (this wasn't even alleged) . See Page v. Utah Home 
Fire Ins. Co.. 391 P2d 290 (1964). 
There having been no jury, and no allegation of unfair trial 
proceedings, we are left with the issue of correcting findings and 
a decree believed to be in error. However, we assert several 
points or error even on this argument. In her motion Gail Menz's 
attorney files an affidavit stating they were surprised by the 
actions of Judge Thorne treating the Fidelity account as commingled 
property. (R. 1284) However, we submit this is not substantiated 
because from the very inception in the answer of Bill Menz to the 
complaint he denied that the inheritance of Gail Menz was separate 
property. (R. 67) Gail Menz was upon notice this was an issue and 
should have anticipated this issue at trial. There was no 
stipulation or scheduling order that in any way established that 
the inheritance monies were to be treated as property rights to be 
vested in each inheriting party separately. 
Furthermore, it is well established that a motion for a new 
trial must be supported by an affidavit showing at least one of the 
circumstances specified in Subdivision (a) of the rule. [Schindler 
v. Schindler, 776 P2d 86 (Utah App. 1989)] The opening paragraph 
of Subdivision (a) reads as follows: 
"Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or any of the 
issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, 
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a 
jury, the court may open the judgement if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusion of law or make new findings and conclusions and 
direct the entry of a new judgment: [the 7 areas or grounds 
follow at length in the text.] 
The affidavit does state one ground, surprise as to one issue 
only, but the motion requests modifications in three other major 
areas of the case that are not supported by an affidavit. If we 
were dealing with irregular proceedings or unfair practices 
touching upon the entire case this might suffice, but it should not 
serve if the affidavit goes only to one point based upon the claim 
of surprise. The surprise in no way affects or touches upon the 
other three claims in the motion, yet the court proceeded to make 
changes in each of these areas without any supporting affidavit of 
wrong doing under subdivision (a) of Rule 59. 
This court will note that the proceedings and ruling by Judge 
Dever on the motion to amend were treated in their entirety like a 
motion to amend, without there being any semblance that the matter 
was being treated like a motion for a new trial. (Motion T.) This 
is clear from not only the content of the motion itself and the 
nature of the hearing, but from the result. Under Rule 59 the 
court is limited to ordering a new trial, allowing a party to 
choose between a remittitur or new trial, or taking new testimony 
and making new findings. The court did none of these. Instead the 
court simply ruled on the motion to amend the pleadings, which 
constituted nothing more than a second ruling on a Rule 52 motion 
to amend the pleadings, or possibly under Rule 4-504(2), Rules of 
Judicial Administration, dealing with the submission of objections. 
In any event, the point upon which to focus is that nothing in the 
way of a new trial was consummated, and what in fact occurred were 
hearings on two separate pleadings filed by Gail Menz to amend the 
ruling of Judges Thorne and Dever. There must be a limit to how 
many times one can assail a court's opinion without taking an 
appeal. 
ISSUE II; 
DID THE COURT UNDER JUDGE DEVER ERROR IN REALLOCATING THE 
ASSETS AND DEBTS FROM THE ALLOCATION MADE FIRST BY JUDGE 
THORNE AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN HIS OWN REVISED FINDINGS? 
In the statement of facts above we have set forth the primary 
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assets of the parties and how they were distributed. Some 
divisions are not at issue, but in Judge Dever's second 
modification he dealt with certain points we discuss individually 
below and with which we take issue concerning the following: 
1. VALUATION OF HOUSEHOLD CONTENTS 
Judge Thorne found that the contents were worth $20,000.00, 
and indicated that he found the estimate of Gail Menz of $8,500.00 
to be too low in her answers to interrogatories, but her verbal 
testimony was that they had a value around $5,000. She really had 
no idea of their value, nor of the extent of the assets she owned. 
(Trial T. Vol.2, p. 153-154) Judge Dever thought $20,000.00 was 
too high and put it back down to $8,500.00, although he made no 
specific finding on how he arrived at the amount, or why $20,000.00 
was too high. Keep in mind that Judge Thorne had the right to 
determine that her estimates on many of these items were too low, 
and Gail Menz clearly had an incentive to estimate the values as 
low as possible. (We note at this point that even from the 
testimony of Gail Menz and the information in Exhibit P16, it isn't 
clear where the $8,500 figure originated.) 
a. If one takes the value placed on the property by Gail Menz 
in Exhibit P16, answer number 76, without giving any value 
whatsoever to the items she states have merely "minimal" or "no", 
or "unknown" value, one arrives at an amount of $5,995.00. This is 
from property she considers to be joint property that she wanted. 
b. If takes the following items for which she gave no value 
and adds our own estimated value, which we have done, we have the 
following result: 
(1) Yard card equipment and tools: $300 
(2) Satellite dish: $100 
(3) Curio cabinet & wall hangings: $200 
(4) 2 sofas and 1 love seat: $400 
(5) Cleaning supplies and equipment: $150 
(6) Linens: $200 
(7) Lamp: $30 
(8) Other wall hangings: $50 
(9) Oval desk: $40 
(10) Living room lamp: $20 
(11) Comforter: $20 
(12) Food: $250 
This court can place its own estimate, but using these figures 
we now come up with a total value of $7,755 for only the items she 
listed. All of these are market values and not replacement values, 
which it was testified by Gail Menz would be much higher. (Trial T. 
Vol. 2, p. 154-155) 
c. We next go through the items in the home that she kept but 
didn't list in her interrogatory answer (See Trial T. Vol. 2, 
beginning at p. 180: 
(1) She replaced the dining set the family had and kept 
the old one. Let's give it a value of $300. 
(2) Refrigerator: She bought a new one, and the old one 
seems to have needed some repairs, although a friend of 
Gail Menz testified it looked like a good refrigerator 
to her (Trial T. Vol. 1, p. 83), so lets give the old 
one that she kept a value of $200. (Ibid. p. 181) 
(3) She bought a second freezer. Let's give the old 
one a value of $100. (Id.) 
(4) She already had a 62" TV downstairs, but bought 
a new one for $1900 for the upstairs. Let's give this 
older 62" TV a value of $750. (Ibid. p. 182) 
(5) Existing range: She bought a new one. Let's give it 
a value of $100. (Id.) 
(6) Existing dishwasher: She bought a new one. Let's give 
it a value of $100. 
Gail Menz testified that she thought Bill Menz was going to take a 
lot of these things, but there is no evidence that he did, and he 
didn't. (Ibid. p. 184) In fact, the evidence was that he was 
living in a 20 foot house trailer, and it was obvious he hadn't 
taken any of the things from the home other than his personal 
effects and a T.V. (Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 197) 
This now brings the value of items up to $9,305. It is 
important to keep in mind that this doesn't include many things 
that a family normally accumulates--everything from cooking 
equipment, dishes, and the like, to books, music collections, 
travel and camping gear, tools, etc., etc. 
Reviewing Ex. P2, we see a long list of purchases going back 
for a number of years, some of which Gail Menz were purchased for 
the children, and which fact we do not dispute. But what items on 
the long list of credit card receipts are for the children and what 
are for the household of the parties? It isn't at all clear. Gail 
Menz likes " . . . nice things, comfortable things." (Trial T. Vol. 
2, p. 179) It was argued on behalf of Bill Menz that it was 
difficult to believe that after a marriage of over 30 years, and 
living in a home in the Olympus Hills area of Salt Lake with a main 
floor of 1,860 square feet of living space, and a basement of 2,245 
square feet, 80% of which was finished, and which home had an 
appraised value of $375,000, the home in which the parties were 
living had only $9,305 worth of household contents total. (Ex. Dl) 
Exhibit P2 shows a broad range of purchases over a short 
period of time which it is very difficult to believe were all for 
the children, despite the undisputed fact that Gail Menz did over 
spend for her children. As just a few examples, we see purchases 
from Ultimate Electronics, August, 1996, twice for $1,369.97 twice; 
September, 1996, Ultimate Electronics, $159.13; May, 1996 from Free 
Meyer for $339.05; May, 1996 from Ultimate Electronics foi 
$297.21; July, 1997 from Wicker & Willow for $105.04 and foi 
$1,388.85; Fred Meyer, June, 1998 for $320.16; etc., etc. Bear ir 
mind that these represent only a few purchases during the last twe 
years of the marriage by a woman given to extravagant spending. 
We submit that Judge Thome was well within his discretionary 
rights in finding that $8,500 worth of contents considering all oi 
these circumstances was simply way too low, and that the $20,00( 
figure was more accurate. 
2. TREATMENT OF INHERITED PROPERTY AS SEPARATE PROPERTY. 
Judge Thorne ruled that the inherited monies had been 
commingled to such an extent that they had lost their separate 
character. Judge Dever disagreed. Throughout the testimony Gail 
Menz keeps speaking about how she had used her inheritance to buy 
household items, and the like. (Trial T. Vol. 2, pp 180-185) The 
point missed here by Gail Menz and the district court in the motion 
hearing is that merely because there was enough money in the 
account to pay back both parties what they had invested originally 
doesn't mean that the inherited monies have retained their separate 
character. 
The evidence showed that Bill Menz received his $82,300 
inheritance in August, 1995 and had invested it in the Fidelity 
account. By the time Gail Menz invested her $140,000 in the 
account in January of 1997 the money Bill Menz had invested had 
been reaping profits for about a year and a half, so when she 
invested her money in 1997 the account already had considerably 
more than the $82,500, from which she benefited and which money she 
used. By the time of the withdrawal by Gail the money of bill had 
been earning income for 3.5 years and hers for only 1.5 years. 
30-3-5, U.C.A., requires that the court make an "equitable 
division" of the property owned by the parties. In the order 
signed by Judge Dever amending for the second time the finds and 
decree he found that "Under Utah law, inherited property of a 
spouse which has been commingled with joint marital property shall 
remain xseparate' property of the inheriting spouse if such 
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inherited property can be traced." (R. 1299) This is not a correct 
statement of Utah law, nor was his opinion properly supported by 
findings. In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P2d 304, at 308 (Utah 
1988), our Supreme Court stated s follows: 
"We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making 'equitable' 
property division pursuant to 30-3-5 should, in accordance 
with the rule prevailing in mst other jurisdictions and with 
the division made in many of our own cases, generally ward 
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during 
the marriage . . . to that spouse, together with any 
appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless (1) the other 
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, 
thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it. . . ., or (2) 
the property has been consumed or its identity lost through 
commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has 
made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The district court made no findings relative to any of these 
issues, ignored the findings Judge Dever himself had previously 
made, and ignored the findings of the trial judge, Judge Thorne, 
but instead merely stated that inherited property is the separate 
property of the inheriting spouse--end of issue. As we have 
stated, it is not satisfactory to conclude that inherited property 
has retained its separate character merely because there are 
sufficient funds in an account to pay that amount of money to the 
donor to the account who had inherited the money originally. 
It is clear from the facts that the parties had commingled the 
monies into one account, had used those monies to pay for a variety 
of family expenses, and that in fact the money of Bill Menz hac 
been building interest in the account much longer than had th< 
money of Gail Menz. We raise the issue of how the district courl 
can justify such a division when Gail Menz withdrew $261,000 froi 
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the account and Bill Menz was left with the remainder of 
$201,211.59, Where is the equity in that? The court does not say. 
During the marriage it was Bill Menz who funded and managed 
the account (Trial T. Vol. 2 pp 165-169). Bill Menz even 
contributed the start up money for the IRA account of Gail Menz 
(Ibid, at 169) . Bill Menz paid half of his income to Gail Menz for 
household expenses and the other half into savings. (Trial T. Vol. 
2, p. 162. --Testimony of Gail Menz.) 
As shown in the evidence above, Gail Menz didn't even know 
how the account worked, and had to redeposit monies because what 
she had withdrawn was a loan against stocks held in the account. 
Furthermore, it is clear that during that time the monies of the 
parties, existing together for years in one account, accumulated 
interest, and was used for common purposes, yet how is this to be 
divided, and can initial deposits to this joint property under such 
circumstances be considered separate property? The only reasonable 
solution is an even distribution of the property. Otherwise Gail 
Menz walks away with an extra $60,000. Where are the findings that 
show she is entitled to that amount? Where are the findings that 
show her $140,000 generated that share of the surplus created above 
the original investments and after the joint expenditures? There 
are no such findings. As from the Mortensen case, we have clear 
commingling, we joint use, we have enhancement through joint 
efforts, or even by the sole efforts of Bill Menz, and thus a 
departure from the Mortensen rule of awarding the property to the 
donor, along with any increase, is warranted. Moreover, there was 
absolutely no showing by Gail Menz, or findings by the district 
court as to how much each account increased in value. 
In addition, this case does not seem to square with the 
requirements set down in Burt v. Burt, 799 P2d 1166 (Utah App. 
1990), wherein Mrs. Burt had inherited property and invested it in 
separate accounts or invested it separately in stocks and bonds. 
While the form changed, the separate identity remained the same. 
Furthermore, the court in Burt found that as long as marital assets 
were used to maintain the family and the separate property. This 
is not so in this case where Gail Menz testified that the family 
had used monies from the account over the years to pay for various 
family expenses. 
An extract from the testimony of Gail Menz at the trial is 
illustrative of the events involved in the handling of the monies: 
///////////////////////////////////////////// 
Examination by Ms. West of Gail Menz: 
Q. And at that time, wasn't the money that the two of you had, 
whether it was inheritance or other, wasn't that all in one 
account, commingled? 
A. Yea. It was commingled. We put it all together. 
Q. Now, has Mr. Menz, over the years, spent money on the 
children--
A. Yes. 
Q. --the grown children? 
A. Oh yes, Uh huh. 
Q. Give a couple of examples, 
A. Lots of--well, we got them cars and we took them on lots of 
trips to Hawaii, Mexico and lots of other places. 
Q. In your opinion, was that--in your belief, was that 
expenditure, the monies that you and Mr. Menz had accumulated for 
the betterment of the family unit? 
A. Yes. (Trial T. Vol. 2, pp 189-190) 
////////////////////////////////////////////// 
Based upon the foregoing we submit that the monies had been 
commingled, that deviation from the rules in Mortensen is required, 
and that an equitable division as made by the trial judge should be 
mandated by this court, and the inequitable division of Judge 
Dever, unsupported as it was by adequate findings, be reversed. 
3. ZIONS BANK HOME EQUITY LOAN 
It is undisputed that for some years the parties had 
maintained an equity line of credit with Zions Bank, and that in 
November of 1998, almost two months before the parties separated, 
Gail Menz paid the balance off in the amount of $13,533.73. (Ex. 
P3) We do not dispute this, nor does it appear that at least for 
some months prior to the pay off date there had been no purchases. 
We dispute the ruling by Judge Dever wherein he reduced the 
equity amount in the home for division by this amount due to the 
fact that Gail Menz had paid this amount for two reasons: 
a. The debt was paid November 5, 1998, (Ex. P3) , and we 
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propose with joint funds. The parties didn't separate until just 
after Christmas of that year. The parties were not only still 
married but still lived together for almost another two months. 
She says she used her "inheritance" money to retire the debt. 
However, from Ex. P18, she withdrew the monies from the Fidelity 
account the second time to correct for what had been in fact a loan 
from Fidelity earlier the withdrawals took place on November 10th 
and 11th, and not on or before the pay off date of November 5, 
1998. She testified that she had retained $34,000 from the first 
effort she made to withdraw the money and she could have used this 
money--but she didn't. She testified that she put this money into 
a private account with Zions Bank. (Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 146) She 
couldn't have used the $106,000 difference because she testified 
she put that back into the Fidelity account. Where did the money 
come from. Clearly not from "her inheritance". It must therefore 
have come from joint monies. 
b. The trial judge, Judge Thorne, could very well have taken 
other factors into consideration in his decision to divide the 
property equally, even if she had used her own funds to pay off 
this particular debt. These factors are critical in understandinc 
Judge Thome's ruling, as well as appreciating why the ruling of 
Judge Dever should be reversed. 
Examples of critical equitable issues to be considerec 
throughout this appeal are as follows: 
1. Gail Menz had retirement accounts at the time the parties 
separated, with a value as of June, 1999 of approximately $70,378 
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By the time of trial the balance was at $20,000. Thus, while the 
action was pending she had spent $50,378 of an asset that was 
subject to division by the court--retirement accounts. (See 
paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 or Statement of Facts above.) 
2. After she took the money out of Fidelity she opened an 
account with Vanguard. During the year prior to the trial she sold 
$166,982 of stock from that account. (Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 168/ Ex. 
P19). Mr. Menz got nothing of this. 
3. She had run up almost $50,000 in credit card debt, most of 
which was not known by Bill Menz, and about $39,000 of which had 
been used for rather extravagant gifts for three married daughters. 
(Ex. P2) We argued against Mr. Menz paying half of this, 
particularly since he hadn't known about it, but in light of the 
overall ruling by Judge Thorne Mr. Menz did not lodge further 
protests, and Bill Menz paid one-half of these bills as required by 
the court's decree. 
Therefore, there appear to be no facts that support that Gail 
Menz paid for the Zion's Bank bill from her own money. It was paid 
off before the parties separated, and should therefore not have 
been a reduction in the equity of the home at the time of trial in 
February of 2000. There were also other equitable considerations 
that support the original division of the court, but weigh against 
the modifications made by Judge Dever. 
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ISSUE III; 
DID THE SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENTS TO JUDGE THORNE'S FINDINGS 
BY JUDGE DEVER CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND DID 
SUCH CHANGES LEAVE THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WITHOUT ADEQUATE 
FINDINGS TO SUPPORT THEM? 
It is established beyond any point of dispute that a trial 
judge is to be granted broad discretion in his decision making 
process in domestic law matters. "Trial courts may exercise broad 
discretion in domestic matter so long as the decision is within the 
confines of legal precedence." Childs v. Childs, 967 P2d 942, 944 
(Utah App. 1998) The court's exercise of this discretion is 
presumed to be correct absent "manifest injustice of inequity that 
indicates a clear abuse of . . . discretion." (Id.) The reasons 
for these decisions are clear. The advantages of the trial judge 
in being able to view first hand the witnesses, the evidence, 
become more deeply acquainted with the facts of the case, etc., all 
enhance the ability of the trial judge, as a rule, to make more 
accurate and fair decisions in divorce cases. 
The question then arises, does this apply to this case. Ir 
this situation we have Judge Thorne who tried the case and whc 
signed off on the first set of findings and a decree. Judge Dever, 
without the advantage of having been involved with the trial, made 
changes that resulted in a net loss to Bill Menz of over $80,000, 
Does this discretionary privilege still lie with the trial judge 
when we have a review by another district judge? Thougl 
authorities may exist, we have been unable to find any that fi1 
this rather unique situation, which resulted from Judge Thome'i 
appointment to the bench on the Court of Appeals and Judge Deve: 
when we have a review by another district judge? Though 
authorities may exist, we have been unable to find any that fit 
this rather unique situation, which resulted from Judge Thome's 
appointment to the bench on the Court of Appeals and Judge Dever 
taking the case over immediately after Judge Thorne signed the 
first set of findings and original decree. 
We must question too the findings made by Judge Dever as to 
their adequacy. One problem in the case is the varied valuation 
dates used. While a trial court is generally required to use the 
date of trial as the valuation date, the "trial court has broad 
discretion to use a different date, such as the date of 
separation." Mo reran v. Morgan, 854 P2d 559, 563 (Utah App. 1993) 
But the more critical issue is the apparent failure of Judge 
Dever in the second round of proceedings to make adequate findings, 
and at one point early on to drastically change findings originally 
approved by Judge Thorne, and which frankly appear to be necessary 
and supportive to a degree of the decisions made by Judge Thorne, 
as well as the relief sought herein. We refer the court to the 
rather drastic changes made in Judge Dever's minute entry beginning 
on R. 1166. The original entries seem well supported by the 
testimony and exhibits, yet the court chose to exclude many 
important facts which we submit is an abuse of discretion and 
leave unsupported many of the conclusions, particularly where the 
judge who made these changes was making them at a time based solely 
upon memoranda, without the aid of a transcript, and certainly 
without the aid of having actually heard the evidence in person. 
In issues above we have cited a number of instances where we 
believe the court under Judge Dever failed to adequately support 
his position with adequate findings. One is the failure to back up 
the payment of the Zions' Bank pay off with adequate findings. 
Another is the failure of the court to factually support with 
findings the court's claim that the inherited property had retained 
its separate character. 
This Court of Appeals remanded this matter for a conference 
between the two judges, and from all appearances it appears that 
the conference was minimal, and that Judge Dever was allowed tc 
rule on virtually all issues. We submit this was not the intent of 
the joint motion, nor do we believe it was the intent of this 
appellate court, with the result being additional error by the 
district court. Had there been an adequate conference between the 
two judges and a joint decision on what constituted a proper set of 
findings and decree one and maybe both of the appeals in this case 
could have been avoided. We ask this court to establish guidelines 
for the operation of a district conference between the judges 
involved on a remand such as the one in this case. 
Based upon the foregoing we submit that Judge Dever7s rulinc 
is lacking in factual support, and that his actions were an abuse 
of discretion. We further submit that the standard for his review 
of Judge Thome's ruling should have been the same as an appellate 
court's review of a trial judge's actions. Unless Judge Dever waj 
able to factually show that Judge Thorne had abused his discretioj 
within the guidelines provided by the appellate courts of thii 
state, the original decision of Judge Thorne should have remained. 
ISSUE IV: 
THE ARGUMENTS OF GAIL MENZ TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL MONIES 
INTO THE MARITAL ESTATE ARE FALLACIOUS. 
In her brief Gail Menz argues that there is approximately 
another $76,000 which should be included in the marital estate and 
be subject to division. This money, she argues is found in the 
form of the difference between the value of the Fidelity account 
after the raid on it by Gail Menz, in the amount of $201,211.59 
(Ex. P18), and the $277,992 ( Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 201) that existed 
at the time of trial, which Mr. Menz testified was his traditional 
IRA account. Let us assume, however, that Mr. Menz was in error 
and this isn't his traditional IRA account, but is the balance 
after the withdrawal by Gail Menz, plus growth over the period of 
about 14 months from the end of November until the time of trial. 
Gail Menz argues that the burden is on Bill Menz to show where 
that money came from. This is not true. Based upon what? He 
testified that it is his money, and is probably the balance of the 
Fidelity money that he transferred to a private account with 
Fidelity with only his name and no longer with both names on the 
account. If they seek to show that other sources of income were 
used to augment this account then the burden is on them, not Bill 
Menz. Gail Menz herself testified, as pointed out above, that Bill 
Menz regularly deposited monies into his accounts, although the 
only testimony on the growth related to this account is that of 
Bill Menz who testified that the growth was entirely from increased 
value in the account. But is this kind of growth possible? 
Gail Menz's IRA grew from $65,000 to $100,000 in one year. 
(Trial T. Vol. 2, p. 167; Ex. 2) Exhibit P18 shows growth during 
the month of November, 1998, on the joint account of $18,205.52. 
In October, 1998, the joint account realized a $16,760.30 increase 
in value. Based on these figures it is not difficult to believe 
that Bill Menz's account increased by this amount. 
Next, we should consider what each did with their monies and 
what kind of a valuation date one should use. During the time of 
the trial Gail Menz spent most of her Granite School District 
retirement money, and spent a good deal of money from her Vanguard 
account. She bought many expensive things for the family home b> 
her own admission. Mr. Menz on the other hand lived in a 20 foot 
house trailer and conserved his money. This has been a lone 
standing issue in the case and both judges rejected the view of 
Gail Menz. Her position is that she should be able to live a 
prodigal lifestyle spending her money as she wishes, while Bil] 
Menz saves his money, and then at trial she wants half of his 
increase. We submit there is not equity in this. She has cited nc 
compelling authority for this proposition, nor has she presentee 
any evidence that shows any abuse of discretion by the lower court 
in rejecting this argument. 
CONCLUSION 
We will be brief. The arguments above speak for themselves a 
to each point. It is the position of Bill Menz that the court made 
one change to the ruling of Judge Thorne, which essentially left 
the conclusions in place. That ruling, or the ruling of Judge 
Thorne should be reinstated, and become the controlling ruling in 
this case. The second ruling by Judge Dever is procedurally 
incorrect, plus it abuses the discretion granted to the lower 
court. While the first revision of Judge Dever may need to have 
some of the findings made by Judge Thorne reinstated to be 
adequately supported by factual findings, the conclusion at that 
point in time should be the ruling, and the second ruling of Judge 
Dever should be reversed. The claims of Gail Menz in her appeal 
regarding the increased value of Mr. Menz's account. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this of November, 2002. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Gail Patricia Menz, 
Appellant and Cross-appellee, 
v. 
William Jeffrey Menz, 
Appellee and Croes-appellant. 
FILED 
Ufeah Court of Appeals 
DEC 2 i 2001 
Pau&tte Stagg 
Cleric of the Court 
ORDER 
Case NO. 2301G567-CA 
This matter is before the court on a stipulated motion to 
temporarily remand the case to the district court to correct or 
modify the-record pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Jointly, the parties raise several 
questions regarding differences in the district court record that 
must "be submitted to and settled by that court." id. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for temporary remand is 
granted. Upon the trial court's disposition of this matter, the 
clerk shall immediately transmit the supplemental record to this 
court, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties are granted twenty-
one days from the entry of trial court's disposition to amend 
their respective docketing statements on appeal. 
DATED this<g££& day of December, 2001. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Mmela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
lan H. Jackson 
ing Judge 
th M. Billings 
ate Presiding Judge 
eil W. Bench 
is Z. Davis 
sla T. Greenwood 
ory K. Orme 
*m A. Thorne, J r . 
Utaf) Court of appeal* 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Appellate Clerks' Office (801) 578-3900 
Judges' Reception (801) 578-3950 
FAX (801)578-3999 
TDD (801) 578-3940 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Appellate Court Administrator 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
May 1, 2002 
Judge L.A. Dever 
Third District Court 
450 South State St 
PO Box 1860 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-1860 
Re: Mehz v. Menz Case" No. 20010567-CA 
Dear Judge Dever: 
This court remanded the above-captioned case to the trial 
court on December 20, 2001, for the purpose of settling the 
differences in the trial court record which were raised 
jointly by the parties. Inasmuch as this motion has been on 
remand for more than 120 days, please advise this court as to 
the status of the matter within fourteen (14) days from the 
date hereof. 
Yours truly, 
Paulette Stagg 0" 
Clerk of the Court 
cc: Suzanne West 
Greg Wall 
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Investment Report 
October 1, 1998 - October 31,1998 
ENV# 055753375 F*^$Pr&. » 
WILLIAM J MENZ 
GAIL P MENZ 
4532 CREST OAK CIR 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84124-3825 
Customer Service 
TouchTone Xpress 800-544-5555 
Brokerage Services 800-544-8656 
Visit us online at www.fidelity.com 
Ultra Service Account 129-104388 WILLIAM J MENZ AND GAIL P MENZ - WITH RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP 
Account Summary 
Beginning market value as of Oct 1 $422,997.07 
Withdrawals -140,000,00 
Margin interest paid ^"^333.8$N 
Change in investment value T67786'.30 
Change in debit balance 105,417.48 
Ending market value as of Oct 31 404,840.97 
Debit balance -105,417.48 
Ending Net Value $299,423.49 
As of October 31,1998, the rate on your current debit 
balance is 7.00% and you can borrow an ; 
$100,274.65 based on your current holdings. 
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debit balance is 8.75% and y^j^f^n borrow an 
^additional $95,105,80 based^ij^gyr current 
fo ld ings. . ' '> - * """ """ 
SsivV, x 



















November 1. 1998 - November 30,1998 
Ultra Service Account 129-104388 WILLIAM J MENZ AND GAIL P MENZ - WITH RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP 
. . . . .
 YW#:'« Quantity Pile* p»r Unit Mutual Fund Total Valua 
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Long-term gam. $16,650.00 
You sold 
Transaction cost: -$7.50 
Short-term gain. $1,532.02 
Long-term gain. $13,164.10 
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November 1,1998 - November 30, 1998 
Ultra Service Account 129-104388 WILLIAM J MENZ AND GAIL P MENZ - WITH RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP 
C o r e A c c o u n t - Cash 
Ascription Amount Balance 
Beginning -$105,417,48 
Securities sold $221,992.50 
3ore account income 21.12 
Deposits 106,000,00 








Deposits ( 1) 
Date Description Amount Dal* 
<S) 1VJ toADf igp§ iTJE£E i f f i a^«^ iaQ6;000 .00 Total 
Description Amount Data Description 
$106,000.00 
Checking Activity (1) 
Check # Dale Code Amount Check * Date Code Amount Check # Dale Code 
1054 11/16 222.000.00 Total -$222,000.00 
Margin Activity as of November 30, 1J$$i 
Period Period Balance Interest Rate - Average Daily Balance Interest Paid Period Period Balance Interest Rale Average Daily Balance 
10/21-11/22 
Total this period 
0 7.000%' 105,409 -$409.92 
-$409.92 
Total year to date 
Daily Additions and Subtractions Cash <3> $1 per share (the following Is provided to you in accordance with industry regulations) 
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222.596.14 11/24 
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• Fidelity Tax Managed^tgfifefundIs now,f variable*, Jhp fund seeks long-term growth and Is sensitive to the potential impact of federal income taxes on shareholder^' 
invesJmsL®f'*' 
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00001 001 000100040000039830 NXT 
EFF DAT: TRAN CODE: 
DATE T/C DESC AMOUNT SEL DATE T/C DESC AMOUNT SI 
04/24/98 95800 STATEMENT .00 _ 05/04/98 64000 PAYMENT 120.00 
05/04/98 93800 ACCRUAL - 34.46 _ 05/26/98 93800 ACCRUAL - 88.01 
05/26/98 95800 STATEMENT .00 _ 06/12/98 64000 PAYMENT 322.00 
06/12/98 93800 ACCRUAL - 61.23 06/25/98 93800 ACCRUAL - 52.81 
06/25/98 95800 STATEMENT .00 _ 07/06/98 64000 PAYMENT 169.00 
07/06/98 93800 ACCRUAL - 37.72 _ 07/24/98 93800 ACCRUAL - 71.39 
07/24/98 95800 STATEMENT .00 _ 08/13/98 64000 PAYMENT 125.00 
08/13/98 93800 ACCRUAL - 71.38 08/26/98 93800 ACCRUAL - 52.54 
08/26/98 95800 STATEMENT .00 _ 09/14/98 64000 PAYMENT 150.00 
09/14/98 93800 ACCRUAL - 67.54 09/25/98 93800 ACCRUAL - 44.95 
09/25/98 95800 STATEMENT .00 _ 10/02/98 64000 PAYMENT 250.00 
10/02/98 93800 ACCRUAL - 22.47 _ 10/26/98 35220 RATE CHAN .00 
m/?6/98 Q38n0 ACr.RTTAT, - 92.70 10/26/98 95800 STATEMENT .00 
11/05/98 64000 PAYMENT^ 13,533.73(_ 11/05/98 93800 ACCRUAL - 31.70 
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